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http://www.democracybarometer.org
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Introduction

The Democracy Barometer is an index of democracy. It aims to overcome the conceptual and methodological shortcomings of existing measures, in order to measure the subtle differences in the quality of established democracies.

The Democracy Barometer is based on a middle range concept of democracy, embracing liberal as well as participatory ideas of democracy, which illuminate the phenomenon from different perspectives. It consists of a stepwise theoretical deduction of fundamental elements of democracy. The starting point is the premise that a democratic system tries to establish a good balance between the normative, interdependent values of freedom and equality and that this requires control. In order to guarantee these three fundamental principles and thus the quality of democracy, nine democratic functions need to be fulfilled. Every function is further disaggregated into two components each, which finally, are measured by several sub-components and indicators.

Figure 1: Structure of the Democracy Barometer

Case selection

The data set is based on two components: The core set consists of all European countries. In addition, the data set was supplemented with additional democracies which fulfilled the following criterion: For at least 10 consecutive years in the period from 1995 to 2017, the country must have a value of 1.5 or below in the combined Freedom House Scores and a Polity IV Score of 9 or higher.

The final set of the democracy barometer includes the following 53 countries:

Albania, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, FR Yugoslavia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kosovo, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Panama, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay
Selection of Indicators

One of the most critical tasks to accomplish is to find appropriate indicators. The Democracy Barometer project aims at providing not only a sound and transparent theoretical concept but also a convincing measurement strategy. In the following we therefore give a short overview of the guiding principles of the selection of our indicators.

Overall, about 300 indicators were collected from existing datasets as well as produced or calculated by the project team on the basis of various types of documents and information. From this collection 98 indicators were selected to build the Democracy Barometer. The indicators constitute the lowest level of a concept tree that mirrors the theoretical framework of the Democracy Barometer, i.e. the stepwise deduction of principles, components, subcomponents, and indicators (see figure 2).

Figure 2: Concept tree of the Democracy Barometer (schematically)

```
Quality of Democracy
  / \    / \    / \     / \\
Principle Principle Component Component
  /    \    /    \    /    \    /    \    /    \\
Component Component Subcomponent Subcomponent
  /    \    /    \    /    \\
Indicator Indicator Indicator Indicator
```

The selection of the indicators was basically theory-driven to ensure content validity. The necessary reduction from 300 to 98 was structured by the following guidelines:

- The Democracy Barometer tries not to rely too heavily on data produced by expert judgments. Rather than or in addition to expert judgments, the Democracy Barometer uses – whenever possible – ‘hard’ data and aggregated survey data.
- To avoid measurement errors as far as possible, data was collected from a wide variety of sources. This should reduce the amount of systematic error. In addition, to minimize random error, subcomponents are composed – if data availability allows for it – of two different indicators which capture similar concepts, but do so in a different fashion or originate from different sources.

We finally selected 98 indicators that fulfill these criteria. In the following we describe them in-depth. The structure of the codebook corresponds to the original structure of the Democracy Barometer (Quality of Democracy, 3 principles, 9 functions with 2 components and several sub-components each). For the indicators, we give a definition, describe the categories and mention when and how we had to replace missing values. The range of values gives an insight of the variance of the indicator. The sources are abbreviated. The explanation of these abbreviations can be found at the end of this codebook.
Scaling

In order to aggregate the indicators to subcomponents and further levels of the concept tree, they need to have the same scales. The Democracy Barometer Project has therefore opted for following standardization:

\[ S = \left[ \frac{X - \mu}{\sigma} \right] + |\min(X)| + 1 \]

The Democracy Barometer provides scholars with access to both the standardized full dataset and the non-standardized raw dataset and therefore many opportunities to create other indices if they like. It is for example possible to measure an entirely different concept of democracy with the data at hand. Researchers supporting a more minimalist concept might consider the functions ‘Competition’, ‘Individual Liberties’ and ‘Participation’ as more important than the other six functions. Others might want to set other aggregation rules. The scientific community is explicitly encouraged to test different ways of scaling, aggregating and/or weighting. Of course, researchers should always make sure to theoretically justify their choices.

Aggregation

For measuring variation in the quality of democracy properly, the relationships between principles, functions, components, and sub-components have to be translated into aggregation rules, which fit the hierarchical concept of our theory. We proceed stepwise up the concept tree from indicators back to subcomponents, components, functions and principles to the overall index of the quality of democracy.

Basic Assumptions

Our aggregation rule is based on the following four basic assumptions:

1. Equilibrium is regarded as a positive feature. It indicates that (at a certain level), the elements of quality of democracy are in balance. Because the assumption of the underlying theory is that the best democracy is one, in which all its elements show a maximum performance and the worst is one where all its elements show a minimum of performance, this is justified.

2. Since we deal in the framework with established democracies, we cannot apply the simple and strict rule of necessary condition. Instead, a modification, which allows for compensation of poor quality in one element by better quality in another element, is introduced.

3. Compensation, however, cannot result in full compensation (substitutability). The larger the disequilibrium, the smaller is the compensation. Thus, disequilibrium has to be punished relative to equilibrium.

4. Equal degrees of disequilibrium should be punished equally, larger disequilibrium more than smaller disequilibrium. This implies progressive discount the larger the disequilibrium.

Furthermore, our theoretical consideration about compensation suggests having costs implied if quality measurements are not in equilibrium. In other words, a democracy is the better the more quality elements score evenly high. The more deviation there is between qualities of elements, the more declining the score. This implies that the measure accounts for discordance, i.e. the higher it is, the lower weight should the better performance in one spatial dimension have.

The aggregation formula reads as follows:

\[ DB = \left[ \prod_{i=1}^{n} X_{i}^{\frac{1}{n}} \right]^{\frac{1}{n}} \]
Aggregation procedure

The Democracy Barometer is a complex measure, which starts from indicators, subcomponents, components, functions, principles, and finally the overall-score (see figure 2). Except for the sub-components composed of indicators and the components composed of the subcomponents of which we cannot postulate necessary and sufficient conditions, the aggregation rule must be applied on every stage of aggregation. Thus, we apply the following aggregation procedure stepwise (see Figure 3):

1. Data must be available for at least two indicators per component in order to aggregate them into a sub-component. If this condition is not met, no value is specified.

2. The first level of aggregation – from indicators to subcomponents – is based on arithmetic means of the standardized indicators. The ‘simple’ average of the indicators corresponds to the idea that the indicators within a subcomponent must measure the same phenomenon and that they can thus compensate each other.

3. The same procedure and the same underlying idea are adopted for the second step of aggregation from subcomponents to components: thus, the components are the means of the subcomponents.

4. Functions are measured by applying the aggregation formula specified above to components.

5. Principles are measured by applying the aggregation formula specified above to functions.

6. Democratic quality is measured by applying the aggregation formula specified above to principles.

Figure 3: Stepwise aggregation (schematically)
General rules

There are three general rules regarding the years to which our coded data apply:

1) Data is only coded when a country exists except as regards a few minor cases. In the Democracy Barometer data, countries that do not exist for the whole time-period (1990-2016) are the following:

   a. Bosnia-Herzegovina before 1992
   b. Czechia before 1993
   c. Czechoslovakia after 1992
   d. Croatia before 1991
   e. Estonia before 1991
   f. Kosovo before 2008
   a. Latvia before 1991
   b. Lithuania before 1991
   c. North Macedonia before 1991
   d. Moldova before 1991
   e. Montenegro before 2006 (exceptions apply for the indicators seatdiff, adminhurd, meandistrict, largpavo, votediff, herfindex, enep, smallpavo, leg_thresh, balpowexle, seatsgov, gallagindex)
   f. Serbia before 2006 (same exceptions as for Montenegro)
   g. Slovakia before 1993
   h. Ukraine before 1991
   i. FR Yugoslavia / Serbia-Montenegro after 2005

2) Coding of FR Yugoslavia (resp. from 2003 Serbia-Montenegro): In case of values not being available explicitly for FR Yugoslavia values from Serbia were coded for the corresponding years

3) Data are furthermore only coded if a country is not occupied by foreign powers and thus only if it constitutes an independent polity. The coding is based on the Polity IV database (Polity = -66) and Bosnia constitutes an exception. Due to this exception, there are no current cases to which the criterion applies.

   a. The country needs to constitute an independent polity as given by point 2 above (no cases at the moment).

Note:

In contrast to the previous versions of the Democracy Barometer, we refrain from normalizing the data to a range from 0 to 100. The reason for this is that no theoretical maximum or minimum is defined. Instead, it is left to the researchers to scale the values for their specific purpose.
QUALITY OF DEMOCRACY

Country
- Definition: Country names

Year
- Definition: Year of observation

Countryyear
- Definition: Country and year of observation

DQ
- Definition: Final index of the quality of democracies.
- Categories: 0 = low/no quality of democracy. 100 = perfect quality of democracy.
- Measurement notes: Democratic quality is measured by applying the aggregation formula to principles.
- Source(s): All variables.

EQUALITY
- Definition: Final index of the equality in democracies.
- Categories: 0 = low/no equality of democracy. 100 = perfect equality of democracy.
- Measurement notes: Principles are measured by applying the aggregation formula to functions.
- Source(s): All variables from the ‘equality in democracies’ section.

CONTROL
- Definition: Final index of the control over democratic institutions.
- Categories: 0 = low/no control over democratic institutions. 100 = perfect control over democratic institutions.
- Measurement notes: Principles are measured by applying the aggregation formula to functions.
- Source(s): All variables from the ‘control over democratic institutions’ section.

FREEDOM
- Definition: Final index of the freedoms guaranteed in democracies.
- Categories: 0 = low/no freedom guaranteed in democracy. 100 = perfect freedom guaranteed in democracy.
- Measurement notes: Principles are measured by applying the aggregation formula to functions.
Source(s): All variables from the ‘freedoms guaranteed in democracies’ section
INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES [INDLIB]

RIGHT TO PHYSICAL INTEGRITY [IL_PHIN]

1. Constitutional provisions guaranteeing physical integrity [IL_PHIN1]

Consttort
- Definition: Existence of constitutional provisions banning torture or inhumane treatment. In case there are no constitutional provisions, the signing of binding international treaties was also considered.
- Categories: 0 = neither mentioned in constitution nor signed a binding treaty; 1 = either mentioned in constitution with reservations, or signed a binding treaty, or signed ECPHRFF with reservation clause; 2 = explicitly mentioned in constitution without reservations, or signed ECPHRFF without reservations.
- Source(s): CON, Constitute, DAP, ECPHRFF, IAPPT, ACHPR, ACHR, CTOCIDTP, CCP.

Convtort
- Definition: Ratification of the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.
- Categories: 0 = Not ratified; 1 = Ratified.
- Measurement notes: -
- Source(s): HDR, UNTREAT.

2. No transgressions by the state [IL_PHIN2]

Politterr
- Definition: Political Terror Scale (reversed). The dataset actually provides three scales, one derived from the Amnesty International Yearbooks, the second from U.S. State Department Reports and the third from the Human Rights Watch. The three scales were combined here by mutually complementing missing scores. If the three scales reported different figures, the higher score was chosen.
- Categories: 1 = Countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their views, and torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare; 2 = There is a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. However, few persons are affected and torture and beatings are exceptional. Political murder is rare; 3 = Here is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment. Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with or without a trial, for political views is accepted; 4 = Civil and political rights violations have expanded to large numbers of the population. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects those who interest themselves in politics or ideas. 5 = terror has expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals.
- Source(s): PTS.

Torture
- Definition: Torture and other cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment or punishment. Torture refers to the purposeful inflicting of extreme pain, whether mental or physical, by government officials or by private individuals at the instigation of government officials. Torture includes the use of physical and other force by police and prison guards that is cruel, inhuman, or degrading. Torture can be anything from simple beatings, to other practices such as rape or administering shock or electrocution as a means of getting information, or a forced confession. Coding is based on US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices and Amnesty International’s Annual Reports.
- Categories: 0 = practiced frequently (50 or more incidents); 1 = practiced occasionally (1 to 49 incidents); 2 = not practiced (no incidents).
- Measurement notes: (I) The original variable was recoded so that code 1 is weighted according to its frequency over time. This was done because category 1 is very broad. Hence, we assume that in country which always carries a 2 (i.e. torture never takes place) except for one year, a value 1 has a different meaning than in a country which is coded as 1 or even 0 (i.e. more than 50 incidents of torture took place) across most years. The weighting is supposed to account for this problem. It was carried out according to the following formula: a) a value '1' was left unweighted if the respective country was assigned the value '0' at least once in the previous four years (i.e. the subsequent four years for the beginning of the time-series); b) if a country was never assigned the value '0' in the previous four years, every value '1' was recoded according to the formula 2-(x/5), whereby x equals the number of values '1' in the respective and the previous four years (i.e. the subsequent four years for the beginning of the time-series), (II) All countries: Missing values for 2012-2017 (III) Additional missing values for Bosnia-Herzegovina 1992-2000; Croatia 1991; Estonia 1991; Estonia 1991; Kosovo 2008; Latvia 1991; Lithuania 1991; North Macedonia 1991-1992; Moldova 1991; Slovenia 1990-1992; Ukraine 1991-1992. (IV) FR Yugoslavia is completely missing.
- Source(s): CIRIGHTS.

3. Mutual acceptance of right to physical integrity by citizens [IL_PHIN3]

Homicide
- Definition: Number of homicides per 100'000 capita (reversed).
- Source(s): EUROSTAT, UNODC, WB, WHO.

Riot
- Definition: Any violent demonstration or clash of more than 100 citizens involving the use of physical force (reversed).
- Source(s): BCNTS.

RIGHT TO FREE CONDUCT OF LIFE [IL_SELFU]

1. Constitutional provisions guaranteeing right to freedom of conduct of life [IL_SELFU1]

Constrel
- Definition: Existence of constitutional provisions protecting religious freedom. In case there are no constitutional provisions, the signing of binding international treaties was also considered.
- Categories: 0 = neither mentioned in constitution nor signed a binding treaty; 1 = either mentioned in constitution with reservations, or signed a binding treaty, or signed ECPHRFF with reservation clause; 2 = explicitly mentioned in constitution without reservations, or signed ECPHRFF without reservations.
- Source(s): CON, Constitute, DAP, ECPHRFF, ICCPR, ACHPR, ACHR; CCP.
Constfreemov
- Definition: This variable measures whether constitutional provisions guaranteeing freedom of movement exist. In case there are no constitutional provisions, the signing of binding international treaties was also considered.
- Categories: 0 = neither mentioned in constitution nor signed a binding treaty; 1 = constitutional guarantees provided or signed a binding treaty.
- Measurement notes:
- Source(s): CON, Constitute, ECPHRFF, ICCPR, UNUDHR; CCP.

2. Freedom of conduct of life [IL_SELFU2]

Freerelig
- Definition: This variable indicates the extent to which the freedom of citizens to exercise and practice their religious beliefs is subject to actual government restrictions. Does the government prohibit or restrict the freedom to practice religious documents in foreign languages? Does religious belief affect membership in a ruling party or a career in government? Does the government discriminate against minority religious groups? Coding is based on US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.
- Categories: 0 = Yes, there are severe restrictions on religious practices by the government; 1 = restrictions are moderate. 2 = there are no restrictions
- Source(s): CIRIGHTS.

Freemove
- Mean of two indicators: Freedom of domestic movement, Freedom of foreign movement
- Definition: This variable indicates the extent to which governments restrict the freedom of citizens to travel within or leave their own country of birth or the movement of certain groups based on political or religious grounds. It also captures the extent to which there are restrictions on the duration of stay abroad, whether citizens lose their property and other assets if they leave for a very long time, whether some citizens have to get permission to leave or when they leave, are not allowed to return. Coding is based on US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.
- Categories: 0 = freedom of movement is severely restricted; 0.5 = intermediate category; 1 = freedom of movement is somewhat restricted; 1.5 = intermediate category; 2 = freedom of movement is unrestricted
- Source(s): CIRIGHTS.

3. Effective property rights [IL_SELFU3]

Propright
- Definition: This variable measures the degree to which a country's laws protect private property rights and the degree to which its government enforces those laws. The more certain the legal protection of property, the higher a country's score; similarly, the greater the chances of government expropriation of property, the lower a country's score. Coding is based on the following sources of information: Economist Intelligence Unit, U.S. Department of Commerce and Country Reports on Human Rights Practices by the U.S. Department of State.
- Categories: 100 = Private property is guaranteed by the government. The court system enforces contracts efficiently and quickly. The justice system punishes those who unlawfully confiscate private property. There is no corruption or expropriation; 90 = Private property is guaranteed by the government. The court system enforces contracts efficiently. The justice system punishes those who unlawfully confiscate private property. Corruption is nearly nonexistent, and expropriation is highly unlikely; 80 = Private property is guaranteed by the government. The court system enforces contracts efficiently but with some delays. Corruption is minimal, and expropriation is highly unlikely; 70 = Private property is
guaranteed by the government. The court system is subject to delays and is lax in enforcing contracts. Corruption is possible but rare, and expropriation is unlikely; 60 = Enforcement of property rights is lax and subject to delays. Corruption is possible but rare, and the judiciary may be influenced by other branches of government. Expropriation is unlikely; 50 = The court system is inefficient and subject to delays. Corruption may be present, and the judiciary may be influenced by other branches of government. Expropriation is possible but rare; 40 = The court system is highly inefficient, and delays are so long that they deter the use of the court system. Corruption is present, and the judiciary is influenced by other branches of government. Expropriation is possible; 30 = Property ownership is weakly protected. The court system is highly inefficient. Corruption is extensive, and the judiciary is strongly influenced by other branches of government. Expropriation is possible; 20 = Private property is weakly protected. The court system is so inefficient and corrupt that outside settlement and arbitration is the norm. Property rights are difficult to enforce. Judicial corruption is extensive. Expropriation is common; 10 = Private property is rarely protected, and almost all property belongs to the state. The country is in such chaos (for example, because of ongoing war) that protection of property is almost impossible to enforce. The judiciary is so corrupt that property is not protected effectively. Expropriation is common; 0 = Private property is outlawed, and all property belongs to the state. People do not have the right to sue others and do not have access to the courts. Corruption is endemic.


Secprop

- Definition: Assessment of whether personal security and private property are adequately protected. Measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 10.

RULE OF LAW [RULEOFLAW]

EQUALITY BEFORE THE LAW [RL_EQL]

1. Constitutional provisions for impartial courts [RL_EQL1]

Constfair
- Definition: Constitutional provisions for fair organization of court system (no exceptional courts and hierarchical judicial system). Sum of two constitutional guarantees:
  o No exceptional courts: This variable documents the existence of constitutional provisions stating that the courts have jurisdiction over all issues of a judicial nature and that civilians are to be tried by ordinary courts or tribunals instead of military or exceptional courts (-1 = Constitution specifically allows civilians to be tried in military courts or explicitly allow the formation of exceptional courts; 0 = Constitution does not specify a ban on exceptional courts; 1 = Constitution provides for a ban on exceptional courts somewhat or provides for it vaguely but not fully; 2 = Constitution provides for a ban on exceptional courts fully and explicitly).
  o Hierarchical judicial system: This variable documents the existence of constitutional provisions stating that the courts are structured in multiple layers with the highest-level court exercising final control/review of lower court decisions (0 = Constitution does not provide for a hierarchical judicial system; 1 = Constitution provides for a hierarchical judicial system somewhat or provides for it vaguely but not fully; 2 = Constitution provides for a hierarchical judicial system fully and explicitly).
- Source(s): CON, Constitute, DAP, CCP.

Pubtrial
- Definition: Existence of constitutional provisions guaranteeing a public trial.
- Categories: 0 = Not mentioned in the constitution; 1 = Explicitly guaranteed or mentioned in the constitution but with exceptions or qualifications, such as a public interest clause; 2 = Explicitly guaranteed or mentioned in the constitution.
- Source(s): CON, Constitute DAP, CCP.

2. Effective independence of the judiciary [RL_EQL2]

Judindepcor
- Definition: Judicial independence: This variable documents the level of independence in the Judiciary from other branches of the government.
- Categories: 0 = Non-independent judiciary: The judiciary is described as non independent; as having significant levels of executive influence or interference, or as having high levels of corruption; 1 = Somewhat Independent Judiciary: The judiciary is described as somewhat independent, with pressure from the executive branch "at times," or with occasional reports of corruption; 2 = Independent Judiciary: The judiciary is described as "generally independent" or as independent in practice with no mention of corruption or outside influences.
- Source(s): DAP, CIRIGHTS.

Judindepinf
- Definition: Assessment of the independence of the judiciary: "The judiciary in your country is independent and not subject to interference by the government and/or parties to the dispute." Measured on a scale ranging from "strongly disagree" (1) to "strongly agree" (7).
3. Effective impartiality of the legal system [RL_EQL3]

Impcourts
- Definition: Impartial Courts: This component is from the Global Competitiveness Report's question of the Efficiency of legal framework in challenging regulations (1-7 where 7 is the best) and the question of the efficiency of legal framework in challenging regulations (1-7 where 7 is the best). Then the mean between the two values of the two questions is calculated and used.
- Source(s): GCR.

Intgrlegal
- Definition: "This component is based on the International Country Risk Guide’s Political Risk Component I for Law and Order: "The ‘law’ sub-component assesses the strength and impartiality of the legal system". Measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 6
- Source(s): ICRG.

QUALITY OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM [RL_QUAL]

1. Constitutional provisions for judicial professionalism [RL_QUAL1]

Profjudg
- Definition: Professionalism (law degree, professional experience) is a precondition written in the constitution for appointment of judges to highest courts. Categories: 0 = No constitutional provision exists; 1 = Constitutional provision exists.
- Source(s): CCP, SGI, BTI, Kritzer et al. (2002).

Proftenure
- Definition: Professionalism of judges concerning length of tenure is written in the constitution. Professionalism is high, if tenure is not restricted, i.e. if it is lifelong. Categories: 0 = Tenure is restricted; 0.5 = Tenure is explicitly restricted to a certain retirement age; 1 = no restriction; lifelong tenure.
- Source(s): CCP, SGI, BTI, Kritzer et al. (2002).

2. Confidence in the justice system [RL_QUAL2]

Confjust
- Definition: Confidence in the legal system: Share of survey respondents indicating high confidence/trust.
Fairjust

- Definition: Assessment of the confidence in the fair administration of justice in the society. Measured on a scale ranging from "There is no confidence in the fair administration of justice in the society" (1) to "There is full confidence in the fair administration of justice in the society" (6). This is recoded into a scale ranging from 0 to 10.


- Source(s): IMD; WGI.

3. Confidence in the police [RL_QUAL3]

Confpolice

- Definition: Confidence in the police: Share of survey respondents indicating high confidence/trust.


- Source(s): own calculation based on AfB, AsB, AsnB, EB, ESS, LAPOP, LB, WVS.

Fairpolice

- Definition: Assessment of reliability/effectiveness of the police services: 1998-1999: "The police in your country effectively safeguard personal security so that it is an important consideration in business activity", "strongly disagree" (1) to "strongly agree" (7). / 2000: "Private business can rely on police for protection", "strongly disagree" (1) to "strongly agree" (7). / 2002-2008: "Police services cannot be relied upon to protect business from criminals" (1) to "can be relied on to protect business from criminals" (7).


- Source(s): GCR.
PUBLIC SPHERE [PUBLIC]

FREEDOM TO ASSOCIATE [PS.FRAS]

1. Constitutional provisions guaranteeing freedom to associate [PS.FRAS1]

Constfras
- Definition: Freedom of Association: This variable documents the existence of constitutional provisions regarding freedom of association. In case there are no constitutional provisions, the signing of binding international treaties was also considered.
- Categories: 0 = neither mentioned in constitution nor signed a binding treaty; 1 = either mentioned in constitution with reservations, or signed a binding treaty, or signed ECPHRFF with reservation clause; 2 = explicitly mentioned in constitution without reservations, or signed ECPHRFF without reservations.
- Source(s): DAP, CON, Constitute, ICESCR, ICCPR, ACHR, ECPHRFF, CCP.

Constass
- Definition: Freedom of Assembly: This variable documents the existence of constitutional provisions protecting the freedom of assembly. In case there are no constitutional provisions, the signing of binding international treaties was also considered.
- Categories: 0 = neither mentioned in constitution nor signed a binding treaty; 1 = either mentioned in constitution with reservations, or signed a binding treaty, or signed ECPHRFF with reservation clause; 2 = explicitly mentioned in constitution without reservations, or signed ECPHRFF without reservations.
- Source(s): DAP, CON, Constitute, ICESCR, ICCPR, ACHR, ECPHRFF, CCP.

2. Degree of association (economic interests) [PS.FRAS2]

Union
- Definition: Trade union density. Union membership as a percentage of wage and salary earners.

Memproorg
- Definition: Membership in professional organizations. Share of survey respondents indicating that they are member in a professional organization.

Source(s): own calculation based on AfB, AsnB, EB, ESS, CSES, WVS.

3. Degree of association (public interests) [PS_FRAS3]

Memhuman

- Definition: Membership in humanitarian organizations. Share of survey respondents indicating that they are member in and/or active for a humanitarian organization.

Source(s): own calculation based on WVS, ESS, EB, LB.

Memenviron

- Definition: Membership in environmental/animal rights organizations. Share of survey respondents indicating that they are member in and/or active for a environmental/animal rights organization.

Source(s): own calculation based on WVS, EB, ESS, LB.

FREEDOM OF OPINION [PS_FROP]

1. Constitutional provisions guaranteeing freedom of speech [PS_FROP1]

Constspeech

- Definition: Freedom of Speech: This variable documents the existence of constitutional provisions concerning freedom of speech. In case there are no constitutional provisions, the signing of binding international treaties was also considered.
- Categories: 0 = neither mentioned in constitution nor signed a binding treaty; 1 = either mentioned in constitution with reservations, or signed a binding treaty, or signed ECPHRFF with reservation clause; 2 = explicitly mentioned in constitution without reservations, or signed ECPHRFF without reservations.
- Source(s): DAP, CON, Constitute, ICESCR, ICCPR, ACHR, ECPHRFF, CCP.

Constpress
- Definition: Freedom of the press: This variable documents the existence of constitutional provisions concerning the freedom of the press. In case there are no constitutional provisions, the signing of binding international treaties was also considered.
- Categories: 0 = neither mentioned in constitution nor signed a binding treaty; 1 = either mentioned in constitution with reservations, or signed a binding treaty, or signed ECPHRFF with reservation clause; 2 = explicitly mentioned in constitution without reservations, or signed ECPHRFF without reservations.
- Source(s): DAP, CON, Constitute, ICESCR, ICCPR, ACHR, ECPHRFF, CCP.

Newsimp
- Definition: Import of newspapers, journals and periodicals in % of GDP (in current US dollars).
- Source(s): own calculation based on WB, WPT, CD.

Newspaper
- Definition: Number of (paid and free) daily newspaper titles per 1 million inhabitants.

3. Political neutrality of press system [PS_FROP3]

Medinteg
- Definition: Integrity of the media based on the extent that media sources are diverse and critical as well as guaranteed freedom of expression and independence from the government. The following five indicators were combined to an index:
(1) freedom of the media to criticise the government, (2) diverse perspectives are presented by the media, (3) media bias towards or against political actors, (4) media corruptness, (5) media criticises the government on a regular basis. Categories: Interval scaled variable ranging from 0 (lowest integrity) 1 (highest integrity).

- Source(s): IDEA-D

**Freeinternet**

- Definition: Freeinternet measures the freedom of the internet by looking at the freedom of access, freedom of navigation and freedom of publication on the internet. Indicator ranges from 1 (low degree of freedom) to 4 (high degree of freedom).
- Source(s): IPD
COMPETITION [COMPET]

VULNERABILITY (COMPETITIVENESS OF ELECTIONS) [CO_COMP]

1. Formal rules for competitiveness [CO_COMP1]

Meandistrict
- Definition: Mean district magnitude in lower parliamentary chamber at the highest level of seat allocation. Average number of parliamentary seats per electoral district.
- Measurement notes: district magnitude in different voting system was coded as follows: (I) Proportional or majoritarian systems: mean district magnitude: meandistrict = (number of seats/number of districts); (II) mixed systems, non-compensatory: meandistrict = ((m_PR * s_PR) + (m_SSD * s_SSD))/S, where m_PR is the average magnitude of the PR districts, s_PR is the overall number of seats under proportional rule, m_SSD is the average magnitude of the SSD districts (=1), s_SSD is the overall number of single-seat districts in parliament and S is the overall number of seats in parliament; (III) mixed systems, compensatory: meandistrict = s_PR + s_SSD, where s_PR is the overall number of seats under proportional rule, and s_SSD is the overall number of all single-seat districts in the territorial units, where the seats are allocated (= whole country); (V) Separate values for Serbia and Montenegro since 1992; (VI) Missing values for Bosnia-Herzegovina 1992-1995; Bulgaria 2008; Estonia 1991; FR Yugoslavia 1990-1991; Montenegro 1990-1991; Poland 1990; Serbia 1990-1999; Taiwan 1990.
- Source(s): DPI; IPU; ACE; Freidenberg (2011); Katz (2001, 2006); Nohlen et al. (1999, 2001); Nohlen (2004, 2005).

Gerryman
- Definition: Possibilities to delimit electoral districts; categories: 3 = no possibility; 2 = body responsible for drawing the boundaries is NOT executive or legislative; 1 = legislative is responsible for drawing the boundaries; 0 = executive is responsible for drawing the boundaries. When several bodies (e.g. legislative and bounding commission) take the lowest value (e.g. legislative = 1).
- Source(s): ACE.

2. Closeness of electoral outcomes [CO_COMP2]

Largpavo
- Definition: Margin of electoral concentration of votes. Calculated as 100% - p strongest, where p strongest = percentage of votes obtained by strongest party.
- Source(s): WZB, Nohlen et al. (2001), Nohlen et al. (1995).

Votediff
- Definition: 100 - [Difference between largest and second largest lower house party in % of all votes].
- Measurement notes: (I) The indicator was reversed by subtracting values from 100. (II) Missing values for Albania 1990; Estonia 1991; Latvia 1991-1992; Lithuania 1991; Moldova 1991-1993; Panama 1990-1993; Poland 1990; South Africa 1990-1993; Ukraine 1991-1993. (III) Czechoslovakia, Kosovo and Taiwan are completely missing. (IV) Separate values for Serbia and Montenegro (based on respective elections). (V) All countries years from 2015 on: If no new election has taken place, previous value copied forward during democratic years.
- Source(s): WZB, Nohlen et al. (2001), Nohlen et al. (1995).

3. Low concentration of seats [CO_COMP3]

Herfindex
- Definition: Herfindahl index: the sum of the squared seat shares of all parties in the lower house of parliament. Measures the degree of concentration (reversed).
- Measurement notes: (I) The indicator was reversed by multiplying values by -1. (II) In case of multiple inaugurations of parliaments in a year, the last one was considered. (III) Missing values for Albania 1990; Estonia 1991; Latvia 1991-1992; Lithuania 1991; North Macedonia 1991-1993; Moldova 1991-1993; Montenegro 1990-2005; Panama 1990-1993; Poland 1990; Serbia 1990; South Africa 1990-1993; Ukraine 1991-1993. (IV) Czechoslovakia, Kosovo and Taiwan are completely missing. (V) All countries years: If no new election has taken place, previous value copied forward during democratic years.
- Source(s): Own calculations based on data from the WZB.

**Seatdiff**

- Definition: Difference between largest and second largest lower house party in % of all seats (reversed).
- Measurement notes: (I) The indicator was reversed by subtracting values from 100. (II) Missing values for Albania 1990; Estonia 1991; Latvia 1991-1992; Lithuania 1990; Moldova 1991-1993; Panama 1990-1993; Poland 1990; South Africa 1990-1993; Ukraine 1991-1993. (III) Czechoslovakia, Kosovo and Taiwan are completely missing. (IV) Separate values for Serbia and Montenegro (based on respective elections). (V) All countries years from 2015 on: If no new election has taken place, previous value copied forward during democratic years.
- Source(s): WZB, Nohlen et al. (2001).

**CONTESTABILITY (OPENNESS OF ELECTIONS) [CO_OPEN]**

1. Low legal hurdles for entry [CO_OPEN1]

**Adminhurd**

- Definition: Degree of administrative hurdles to become an electoral competitor (reversed). Mean of reg_parr_part and reg_parr_cand:
  - $\text{Reg\_parr\_part} = \text{Bars} \text{riers for the registration of parties: sum of Reg\_comp, Reg\_req\_pet, Reg\_req\_dep, Reg\_req\_oth}$ (max. 12 points possible).
    - $\text{Reg\_comp:} \text{ Is registration compulsory for parties to run in elections? Categories: } 0 = \text{No (for none of the parties); } 1 = \text{No, but registration gives party advantages (e.g. name of party on ballot paper); } 2 = \text{Yes, but only for new parties or for parties without candidates in preceding elections or without electoral success in preceding elections; } 3 = \text{Yes, for all parties in every election.}$
    - $\text{Reg\_req\_pet:} \text{ Requirements for registration of parties: petition / announcement. Categories: } 0 = \text{No petition requirements; } 1 = \text{Petition requirements low (< 1000 signatures) 2 = Petition requirements medium (1000-4000 signatures); } 3 = \text{Petition requirements high (>= 4000 signatures). Note: According to Bischoff's (2006) calculation and comparable with the GDP-measure (see below Cand\_dep): 10 persons are able to collect 200 signatures in one week-day: 1000 signatures = 1 week; 4000 signatures = 1 month; 2400 signatures = ½ year; more than 5000 signatures = 1 year.}$
    - $\text{Reg\_req\_dep:} \text{ Requirements for registration of parties: fees. Categories: } 0 = \text{No fee required (or only deposit); } 1 = \text{Low fees required (< 2% of GDP per capita); } 2 = \text{Medium fees required (2%-8% of GDP per capita); } 3 = \text{High fees required (>= 8% of GDP per capita). Subtract -1 if requirements for reimbursement are low (< 1% of all votes).}$
    - $\text{Reg\_req\_oth:} \text{ Requirements for registration of parties: other requirements. Categories: } 0 = \text{No other requirements; } 1 = \text{Low other requirements (fixed number of members / supporters but less than 0.1% of voting age population (Source(s): IDEA Turnout 1995 (or nearest year)) OR written statutes OR regional distribution required); } 2 = \text{Medium other requirements (fixed number of members/supporters of at least 0.1% of voting age population OR two of the three additional requirements listed for category 1 at the same time); } 3 = \text{High other requirements (fixed number of members/supporters of at least 0.5% of voting age population OR/AND registration only possible at precise dates [e.g. every 3 years]).}$
  - $\text{Reg\_parr\_cand} = \text{Barriers for registration of candidates: sum of Cand\_pet, Cand\_dep, Cand\_dep\_reim}$ (max. 9 points possible). If independent candidates are not allowed to run for election, the maximum value of 9 (very high barriers) is given (this is the case for Costa Rica and South Africa).
    - $\text{Cand\_pet:} \text{ Requirements for registration of candidates: petition / announcement. Categories: } 0 = \text{No petition requirement; } 1 = \text{Petition requirements low (< 100 signatures OR recommendations of members of national parliament OR only party announcement); } 2 = \text{Petition requirements medium (100-400 signatures); } 3 = \text{Petition requirements high (> 400 signatures).}$ If different number of signatures per district mean number of signatures is taken. Note: According to Bischoff's (2006) calculation and comparable with the GDP-measure (see Cand\_dep): 1 person is able to collect 20 signatures in one week-day: 100 signatures = 1 week; 400 signatures = 1 month.
    - $\text{Cand\_dep:} \text{ Requirements for registration of candidates: deposit. Categories: } 0 = \text{No deposit required; } 1 = \text{Low deposit required (< 2% of GDP per capita); } 2 = \text{Medium deposit required (2%-8% of GDP per capita); } 3 = \text{High deposit required (>= 8% of GDP per capita). If deposit must be paid per list (not per candidate), the fee is divided by 10.}$
- **Cand_dep_reim**: Is the deposit refundable? Categories: 0 = No deposit required; 1 = Low requirements for reimbursement (< 5% of votes); 2 = High requirements for reimbursement (≥ 5% of valid votes); 3 = Non-refundable deposit.

  - Measurement notes: (I) The scale was reversed by multiplying values by -1. (II) Where regulations differ across states in the US, the mean was taken. (III) Separate values for Serbia and Montenegro available for entire period. (IV) All countries: missing values for 2009-2017. (V) Additional missing values for countries: Canada 2008; Chile 2008; Costa Rica 2008; Croatia 2008; Cyprus 2008; Czech Republic 2008; Denmark 2008; Estonia 2008; Finland 2008; France 2008; Germany 2008; Greece 2008; Hungary 2008; Iceland 2008; Italy 2008; Japan 2008; Latvia 2008; Luxembourg 2008; Malta 2008; Moldova 2008; Netherlands 2008; New Zealand 2008; Norway 2008; Poland 2008; Portugal 2008; Romania 2008; Slovenia 2008; South Africa 2008; Sweden 2008; Switzerland 2008; Turkey 2008; Ukraine 2008; United Kingdom 2008; United States 2008; Uruguay 2008. (V) Panama, Slovakia and Taiwan are completely missing.


**Leg_thresh**

- Definition: Effective threshold calculated as approximately the midway between the threshold of representation (the lowest level of support with which a party could win a seat under the most favourable conditions) and the threshold of exclusion (the highest level of support with which a party could fail to win a seat under the most unfavourable conditions). Calculated according to Lijphart's formula: \( T_{eff} = \frac{75\%}{M+1} \). We consider only theoretical information and NOT results from elections. The indicator was reversed by subtracting the effective threshold from 100 (lower effective thresholds receive higher values). If the legal threshold in proportional systems and mixed compensatory systems, respectively, exceeds the effective threshold, the legal threshold becomes the effective threshold.


  - Measurement notes: (I) Missing values replaced by closest available value. 

  - Source(s): WZB, Nohlen et al. (2001).

**Smallpavo**

- Definition: Chance for small parties to win a seat: vote share of smallest party in the lower house of national parliament (reversed = multiplied with -1). The higher the value, the smaller the smallest party, hence the greater the possibility for small parties to win a seat. Independent candidates and "other" parties are included into the calculation of Smallpavo.


  - Source(s): WZB, Nohlen et al. (2001).

**Enep**

- Definition: Effective number of parties at the electoral level.


  - Source(s): WZB, Nohlen et al. (2001).
3. Effective Access to Resources [CO_OPEN3]

Ceilings
- Definition: Ceilings on expenditure and income of political parties. Sum of two variables: 0 = there are no ceilings on expenditure or income of political parties; +1 if there are either ceilings on expenditure or income of political parties; +2 if there are ceilings on both, expenditure and income of political parties.
- Sources: IDEA-F, Griner/Zovatto (2005), Castillo/Zovatto (1998); Gutierrez/Zovatto (2011); GRECO; Cons; Partylaw.

Funding
- Definition: Provisions for direct and indirect public funding of political parties. Sum of two variables: 0 = there are no provisions for direct or indirect funding; +1 if there are either provisions for direct or indirect public funding; +2 if there are provisions for both, direct and indirect party funding.
MUTUAL CONSTRAINTS OF CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS [MUTUCONS]

CHECKS BETWEEN THREE POWERS [MC_CHECKS]

1. Balance of checks between executive and legislative powers [MC_CHECKS1]

Balexleg
- Definition: Balance of checks between the executive and the legislative powers as represented by the (reversed) absolute difference (controlex - controlle) in the standardized checks available to the legislative (controlex) and the executive (controlle) powers over each other. The measure is reversed by subtracting the absolute difference from 100. Therefore, low values indicate unbalanced checks either in favour of the executive or the legislative, whereas high values are assigned when there is a balance in checks between the legislative and the executive branches.
- Source(s): see controlex, controlle.

Controlex
- Definition: Summary of constitutional provisions for checks (legveto, legappr, confleg, removeex) over the executive available to the legislative, where low values indicate low levels of constitutional checks by the legislative branch, and high values indicate high levels of constitutional checks by the legislative branch.
- Measurement notes: -
- Source(s): See legveto, agendaset, confleg, removeex.

Legveto
- Definition: does the legislative branch have the constitutional power to stop executive actions (legislative veto)?
- Categories: 0 = No constitutional provision exists; 1 = Constitutional provision exists.
- Source(s): IAEP, CON, Constitute, CCP.

Legappr
- Definition: Is there a constitutional requirement for the executive to secure approval by the legislative branch on changes and policies proposed on the following issues: budget, ratification of international treaties (1 = one chamber only, 2 = two chambers), changes to taxes.
- Source(s): IAEP, CON, Constitute, CCP.

Confleg
- Definition: Does a constitutional requirement exist for the executive to seek legislative confidence upon formation?
- Categories: 0 = No constitutional provision exists; 1 = Constitutional provision exists.
- Measurement notes: -
- Source(s): CON, Constitute, CCP.

Removex
- Definition: Does the legislative branch have the constitutional power to remove the executive from office (by means of instruments such as vote of no confidence or impeachment) and how difficult is this?
- Categories: 0 = No possibility to remove the executive; 1 = The circumstances/procedure to remove the executive are difficult (circumstances are defined as breach of law or something similar); 2 = The circumstances/procedure to remove the executive are challenging (absolute parliamentary majority or more); 3 = The circumstances/procedure to remove the Executive are easy (simple majority).
Controlling
- Definition: Summary of constitutional provisions for checks (exveto, dissleg, elecex) over the legislative available to the executive.
- Measurement notes: -

Exveto
- Definition: Does the executive have the constitutional power to veto laws passed by the legislature?
- Categories: 0 = No constitutional provision exists, 1 = Constitutional provision exists.
- Measurement notes: (V) Values for Serbia and Montenegro based on values of Yugoslavia. (VI) All countries: values from 2005 were copied to 2006-2007 unless a constitutional change took place.
- Source(s): IAEP, CCP, CON, Constitute.

Dissleg
- Definition: Does the executive have the constitutional power to dissolve the legislature?
- Categories: Categories: 0 = No constitutional provision exists, 1 = Constitutional provision exists.
- Measurement notes: (I) All countries: values from 2005 were copied to 2006-2007 unless a constitutional change took place.
- Source(s): IAEP, CCP, CON, Constitute.

Elecex
- Definition: Does the country hold national elections for an executive (direct election)?
- Categories: 0: No, 1: Yes.
- Measurement notes: (I) All countries: values from 2005 were copied to 2006-2007 unless a constitutional change took place.
- Source(s): IAEP, CCP, CON, Constitute.

2. Balance between executive and legislative powers [MC_CHECKS2]

Balpowexle
- Definition: Balance of powers (opposition vs. government) as calculated by: $C = 1 - \frac{\text{abs}((G-O)/100)}{\Sigma g^i / \Sigma g}$; and $C = \frac{\Sigma o^i}{\Sigma o}$, $g$ and $o$ stand for the seat shares of government and opposition parties respectively. $C$ equals 0 whenever the government (or the opposition) controls the whole legislature and 1 if there is a full balance between government and opposition.
- Measurement notes: (I) If there are multiple values in one year, the mean of these values is taken. (II) Each seat composition value was counted as part of the year during which the inauguration of the new legislature / new members of the legislature occurred. (III) NA values were dealt with as follows: First, each recorded composition was carried forward up to six years after the inauguration year. Second, remaining NAs between available values were replaced by linear interpolation. (IV) Missing values for Albania 1990; Cyprus 1990-1992; Estonia 1991; FR Yugoslavia 1990; Latvia 1991-1992; Lithuania 1991; Moldova 1991-1993; Montenegro 1990; Panama 1990-1993; Poland 1990; Serbia 1990; South Africa 1990-1993; Ukraine 1991-2003. (V) Kosovo and Taiwan are completely missing.
- Source(s): WZB

Seatsgov
- Definition: Proportion of parliamentary seats belonging to governing parties as calculated by the inverse logit: $1/(1+e^{-2.71\cdot \log(\frac{g}{50\%})})$, $g$ stands for the seat shares of government parties. The indicator takes low values for majority governments and high values for minority governments. The inverse logit is taken to weigh changes in a situation of a relatively balanced parliament (i.e. $g$ close to 50 percent) more than changes of clear majorities of either the opposition or governing parties.
- Measurement notes: (I) If there are multiple values in one year, the mean of these values is taken. (II) Each seat composition value was counted as part of the year during which the inauguration of the new legislature / new members of the legislature occurred. (III) NA values were dealt with as follows: First, each recorded composition was carried forward up to six years after the inauguration year. Second, remaining NAs between available values were replaced by linear interpolation.
- Source(s): WZB

3. Judicial review [MC_CHECKS3]

Judrev
- Definition: This variable documents the existence of constitutional provisions allowing for judicial or constitutional review of legislative and executive decisions.
- Categories: -1 = constitution gives the power of constitutional review to another branch of government such as the executive or the legislature; 0 = constitution does not provide for judicial (constitutional) review; 1 = constitution provides for judicial review somewhat or provides for it vaguely but not fully; 2 = constitution provides for judicial review fully and explicitly.
- Source(s): DAP, CON, Constitute, CCP.

VERTICAL CHECKS OF POWER [MC_VERT]

1. Degree of Federalism [MC_VERT1]

Federalism
- Definition: Federalism as defined by Gerring and Thacker (2004) (indicator was reversed).
- Categories: 0 = non-federal; 1 = semi-federal [where there are elective legislatures at the regional level but in which constitutional sovereignty is still reserved to the national government]; and 2 = federal [elective regional legislatures plus constitutional recognition of subnational authority].
- Source(s): CCP, CON, Constitute, Gerring/Thacker 2004.

Bicameralism
- Definition: Bicameralism as defined by Gerring and Thacker (2004) (indicator was reversed).
- Categories: 0 = unicameral [no or weak upper house]; 1 = weak bicameral [upper house has some effective veto power, though not necessarily a formal veto]; and 2 = strong bicameral [same as above but the two houses are also incongruent])
- Source(s): CCP, CON, Constitute, Gerring/Thacker 2004.

2. Subnational fiscal autonomy [MC_VERT2]

Subexp
- Definition: Subnational expenditures as a percentage of the total national expenditures.

There was a change in the new standards of the reporting system to the System of National Accounts (SNA) 2008, which was implemented by most OECD countries since December 2014. This can lead to a jump in the indicator from 2013 to 2014 that does not derive from a change in the federal finances but which is due to the change of the measurement of the data.

- Source(s): own calculations based on data of GFS, WB, OECD, Dexia

Subrev


- North Macedonia. (X) There was a change in the new standards of the reporting system to the System of National Accounts (SNA) 2008, which was implemented by most OECD countries since December 2014. This can lead to a jump in the indicator from 2013 to 2014 that does not derive from a change in the federal finances but which is due to the change of the measurement of the data.

- Source(s): own calculations based on data of GFS, WB, OECD
GOVERNMENTAL CAPABILITY [GOVCAP]

GOVERNMENT RESOURCES [GC_GORE]

1. Time horizon for action [GC_GORE1]

Leglen
- Definition: Length of governmental (legislative or presidential) period (if no given rule in constitution the maximum length is taken).
- Source(s): CCP, CON, Constitute, IPU.

Govterm
- Definition: Is there a term limit of government? A term limit exists, when it is not possible to re-elect an incumbent after a certain period of time.
- Categories: 0 = 0 to 4 years; 1 = 5 to 8 years; 2 = 9-12 years; 3 = more than 12 years.
- Source(s): CON, Constitute, CIA.

2. Public support [GC_GORE2]

Congov
- Definition: Confidence in the government: Share of survey respondents indicating high confidence/trust.
- Source(s): own calculation based on AfB, AsB, AsnB, , EB, ESS, EES, ISS, LAPOP, LB, WVS.,

Devbehav
- Definition: Deviant behaviour. Share of survey who answer – on a scale from 1 (never justifiable) to 10 (always justifiable) – 8, 9 or 10 regarding each of the following activities: a) avoiding a fare on public transport, b) cheating on taxes, c) someone accepting a bribe and d) claiming government benefits.
3. Governmental stability [GC_GORE3]

Govstab
- Definition: Stability of government. A cabinet is seen as stable if its party composition does not change during a legislative period. Relatively short governments, i.e. interim governments (< 1/6 of the legislation), are excluded. A government gets 100% (for all years within a legislative period) if it does not change in the respective legislative period. If there is a change, Govstab reflects the number of days that the government was stable as a share of the remaining possible period.
- Measurement notes: (I) When there were more than two governments within one single election period, and the last government ended due to normal general elections the last government does not receive 100 per cent, but the value of the longest government in the respective period, unless the third or later government, was the only government in the election period which lasted for more than 1/6 of legislation. Missing values from interim governments are completed with closest value of the respective election period (if two values have the same distance, the earlier value is taken). If there are multiple values in one year the mean is taken. Values are copied to the entire government period. (II) The Swiss government is a cooperative government, and the ‘prime minister’ (Bundespräsident), who has a mainly representative function, changes every year (but cabinet does not change). Switzerland is therefore always coded 100. (III) All values greater than 100 are set to 100. (IV) Elections between 1 January and 31 December refer to the given year. (V) In presidential systems, government change is measured by president change. (VI) NA values were dealt with as follows: First, each recorded composition was carried forward up to six years after the inauguration year. Second, remaining NAs between available values were replaced by linear interpolation. (VII) Missing values for Albania 1990; Costa Rica 2011-2017; Estonia 1991; FR Yugoslavia 1990; Latvia 1991-1992; Lithuania 1991-1992; Moldova 1991-1993; Panama 1990-1993; Poland 1990; Portugal 1990; South Africa 1990-1993; Ukraine 1991-1993. (VIII) Czechoslovakia, Kosovo and Taiwan are completely missing.
- Source(s): own calculation according to procedure by Lijphart (1984), data from WZB.

Cabchange
- Definition: Number of major cabinet changes.
- Source(s): BCNTS.

CONDITIONS FOR EFFICIENT IMPLEMENTATION [GP_CEIM]

1. No Anti-government action [GC_CEIM1]

Antigovact
- Definition: Legitimate anti-government action (reversed). Sum of two indicators:
  - Agdemons: Number of peaceful public gatherings of at least 100 people for the primary purpose of displaying or voicing their opposition to government policies or authority, excluding demonstrations of a distinctly anti-foreign nature.
  - Genstrike: Number of strikes of 1,000 or more industrial or service workers that involves more than one employer and that is aimed at national government policies or authority.
- Source(s): BCNTS.

Violantigov
- Definition: Illegitimate anti-government action (reversed). Sum of two indicators:
- **Guerill**: Number of incidents of armed activity, sabotage, or bombings carried on by independent bands of citizens or irregular forces and aimed at the overthrow of the present regime.
- **Revolut**: Number of incidents of illegal or forced change in the top government elite, any attempt at such a change, or any successful or unsuccessful armed rebellion whose aim is independence from the central government.

- **Source(s)**: BCNTS.

### 2. No Interference [GC_CEIM2]

#### Mip
- **Definition**: No political interference by the military:
  - **MIP**: Military in politics. The military is not elected by anyone. Therefore, its involvement in politics, even at a peripheral level, is a diminution of democratic accountability. However, it also has other significant implications. The military might, for example, become involved in government because of an actual or created internal or external threat. Such a situation would imply the distortion of government policy in order to meet this threat, for example by increasing the defense budget at the expense of other budget allocations. In some countries, the threat of military take-over can force an elected government to change policy or cause its replacement by another government more amenable to the military’s wishes. A military takeover or threat of a takeover may also represent a high risk if it is an indication that the government is unable to function effectively and that the country therefore has an uneasy environment for foreign businesses; values from 0 (high risk) to 6 (no risk of political interference by military).
- **Source(s)**: ICRG.

#### Rip
- **Definition**: No political interference by religion. Religious tensions may stem from the domination of society and/or governance by a single religious group that seeks to replace civil law by religious law and to exclude other religions from the political and/or social process; the desire of a single religious group to dominate governance; the suppression of religious freedom; the desire of a religious group to express its own identity, separate from the country as a whole. The risk involved in these situations range from inexperienced people imposing inappropriate policies through civil dissent to civil war; values from 0 (high risk) to 6 (no risk of political interference by religion).
- **Source(s)**: ICRG.

### 3. Administrative assertiveness [GC_CEIM3]

#### Govdec
- **Definition**: Assessment of the effective implementation of government decisions. Measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 10.
- **Source(s)**: IMD; ICRG; WGI.

#### Bureau
- **Definition**: Bureaucracy quality. High points are given to countries where the bureaucracy has the strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy or interruptions in government services. In these low risk countries, the
bureaucracy tends to be somewhat autonomous from political pressure and to have an established mechanism for recruitment and training. Countries that lack the cushioning effect of a strong bureaucracy receive low points because a change in government tends to be traumatic in terms of policy formulation and day-to-day administrative functions.

TRANSPARENCY [TRANSPAR]

NO SECRECY [TR_NOSEC]

1. Disclosure of party financing [TR_NOSEC1]

Discinco
- Definition: Disclosure rules for contributions to political parties (parties have to disclose contributions received). 0 = no provision for disclosure of income; 1 = rules on disclosure of income.
- Sources: IDEA-F, Griner/Zovatto (2005), Castillo/Zovatto (1998); Gutierrez/Zovatto (2011); GRECO; Cons; Partylaw.

Discexp
- Definition: Disclosure rules for expenditures of political parties (parties have to disclose contributions received). 0 = no provision for disclosure of income; 1 = rules on disclosure of income.
- Source(s): IDEA-F, Griner/Zovatto (2005), Castillo/Zovatto (1998); Gutierrez/Zovatto (2011); GRECO; Cons; Partylaw.

2. Absence of corruption [TR_NOSEC2]

Corrup
- Definition: Assessment of corruption within the political system. Such corruption is a threat to foreign investment for several reasons: it distorts the economic and financial environment; it reduces the efficiency of government and business by enabling people to assume positions of power through patronage rather than ability; and, last but not least, introduces an inherent instability into the political process. Values range from 0 (high risk of corruption) to 6 (no risk of corruption between politics and business).
- Source(s): ICRG.

CPI
- Definition: The Corruption Perception Index (CPI) measures the overall extent of corruption (frequency and/or size of bribes) in the public and political sectors. Assessments are based on surveys of business people and assessments by country analysts. Sources can vary from year to year. Values range from 0 to 10 (the higher the values, the less corruption).
- Source(s): TI.
**PROVISIONS FOR TRANSPARENT POLITICAL PROCESS [TR_PTPP]**

1. **Freedom of information [TR_PTPP1]**

   **LegFOI**
   - **Definition:** Legal restriction of freedom of information / barriers for access to official information.
   - **Categories:**
     - 0 = No Freedom of Information (FOI) legislation
     - 1 = High restrictions (high fees for information AND long delays [more than 2 weeks])
     - 2 = Considerable restrictions (1 restriction only (fee, delay))
     - 3 = No restrictions (no fee, immediate information [less than 2 weeks])
   - **Measurement notes:** (I) Value since year law came into force. (II) FR Yugoslavia is completely missing.
   - **Source(s):** RTI, own composition based on Banisar (2006), CON, CDA, Tromp (2008), HRR, FI.

3. **Willingness for transparent communication [TR_PTPP2]**

   **Transp**
   - **Definition:** Assessment of the transparency of government policy. Measured on a scale ranging from "The government does not often communicate its intentions successfully" (1) to "The government is transparent towards citizens" (6). This is recoded into a scale ranging from 0 to 10.
PARTICIPATION [PARTICIP]

EQUALITY OF PARTICIPATION [PAR_EQPA]

1. Suffrage [PAR_EQPA1]

Suffrage
- Definition: Requirements for and disqualifications of active suffrage. 14-sum of requirements and disqualifications.
- Requirements:
  - Age: different constraints of age regarding active suffrage in the national parliament (single or lower chamber). Categories: 0 = to be entitled to active suffrage at the age of 18 or before; 1 = to be entitled to active suffrage at the age between 19 and 24.
  - Citizenship: measures if citizenship is a precondition for active suffrage in the national parliament (single or lower chamber). Categories: 0 = citizenship is no precondition for active suffrage; 1 = citizenship is a precondition for active suffrage.
  - Citizenship by birth: measures if citizenship BY BIRTH is a precondition for active suffrage in the national parliament (single or lower chamber). Categories: 0 = citizenship by birth is no precondition for active suffrage; 1 = citizenship by birth is a precondition for active suffrage.
  - Extended requirements: measures whether naturalized citizens are required to wait additional years after naturalization to be granted active suffrage. Categories: 0 = extended waiting period after naturalization not required for active suffrage; 1 = extended waiting period after naturalization is required for active suffrage.
  - Residency: measures whether citizens are required to live in a country to be entitled to vote. Categories: 0 = residency is no precondition for active suffrage; 1 = residency is a precondition for active suffrage.
- Disqualifications:
  - Insanity: measures if citizens with mental illness and/or insanity are deprived of the active suffrage rights. Categories: 0 = people with mental illness/insanity are not deprived of the active suffrage rights; 1 = people with mental illness/insanity are deprived of the active suffrage rights.
  - Conviction: measures if citizens convicted of a crime are deprived of active suffrage rights. Categories: 0 = convicted citizens are not deprived of active suffrage rights; 1 = convicted citizens are deprived of active suffrage rights only for specific crimes (e.g. electoral fraud, organized crime, treason, etc.); 2 = convicted citizens are generally deprived of active suffrage rights.
  - Imprisonment: measures if inmates are deprived of active suffrage rights. Categories: 0 = inmates are not deprived of active suffrage rights; 1 = inmates are deprived of active suffrage rights during imprisonment; 2 = former inmates are deprived of active suffrage rights after release (determined time or indefinitely).
  - Suspension: measures whether active suffrage rights may be legally suspended. Categories: 0 = Active suffrage rights cannot be legally suspended; 1 = Active suffrage rights can be legally suspended.
  - Office: measures if specific offices (e.g. electoral commissioners) and/or jobs (civil service) imply the loss of active suffrage rights. Categories: 0 = Loss of active suffrage rights is not related to specific office holders and/or jobs; 1 = higher jobs in the electoral process entail the loss of active suffrage rights; 2 = job as civil servant entails the loss of active suffrage rights.
  - Others: measures if additional disqualifications to the ones cited above exist. Categories: 0 = no additional disqualifications; 1 = additional disqualifications in place.
- Measurement notes: (I) The scale was reversed by subtracting the values from the maximum (14). A high value indicates more requirements and disqualifications of suffrage and a lower value fewer. (II) Kosovo and Taiwan are completely missing.
- Source(s): IPU-Chronicles.

Regprovap
- Definition: Registered voters as a percentage of voting age population, in parliamentary elections. Values were copied until to the following legislation.
- Source(s): IDEA-T, Nohlen (1995)
2. Non-selectivity of electoral participation [PAR_EQPA2]

Repturned

- Definition: Representative voter turnout in national legislative elections (lower house if applicable) in terms of resources (education and income). Calculated as follows: (1) Calculation of gaps in terms of education and in terms of income (3 groups each): education gap = mean of share of respondents with high/middle/low education in survey – share of voting respondents with high/middle/low education (differences in absolute values); income gap = mean of share of respondents with high/middle/low income – share of voting respondents with high/middle/low income (differences in absolute values). (2) Calculation of degree of unrepresentative turnout: sum of education gap + income gap. (3) The scale was reversed by multiplying its values by -1.


- Source(s): own calculation based on AfB, AsB, AsnB, CSES, ESS, LAPOP, LB, WVS, ISS, EES, EB.

Repturneag

- Definition: Representative voter turnout in legislative elections in terms of gender and age. Calculated as follows: (1) Calculation of gaps in terms of gender and in terms of age (3 groups: 15-30; 31-65; 65+): gender gap = mean of share of women in survey – share of female voting respondents and share of men in survey – share of male voting respondents (differences in absolute values); age gap = mean of share of respondents 18-30/31-65/65+ years old – respective share of 18-30/31-65/65+ year old voting respondents (differences in absolute values). (2) Calculation of degree of unrepresentative turnout: sum of gender gap + age gap. (3) The scale was reversed by multiplying its values by -1.


- Source(s): own calculation based on AfB, AsB, AsnB, CSES, ESS, LAPOP, LB, WVS, ISS, EES, EB.

3. Non-selectivity of alternative participation [PAR_EQPA3]

Repaltined

- Definition: Representative participation in alternative forms of participation (signing petitions, attending lawful demonstrations) in terms of resources (education and income). Calculated as follows: (1) Calculation of gaps in terms of education and in terms of income (3 groups each): education gap = mean of share of respondents with high/middle/low education in survey – share of participating respondents (signing petitions / attending demonstrations) with high/middle/low
education (differences in absolute values); income gap = mean of share of respondents with high/middle/low income – share of participating respondents (signing petitions / attending demonstrations) with high/middle/low income (differences in absolute values). (2) Calculation of degree of unrepresentative participation: sum of education gap + income gap for both participation forms (signing petitions / attending demonstrations). (3) Overall mean of both indicators (signing petition / attending demonstrations) for unrepresentative participation. (4) The scale was reversed by multiplying its values by -1.


- Source(s): own calculation based on AfB, AsB, AsnB, CSES, ESS, LAPOP, LB, WVS, ISS, EES, EB.

**Repaltgeag**

- Definition: Representative participation in alternative forms of participation (signing petitions, attending lawful demonstrations) in terms of gender and age. Calculated as follows: (1) Calculation of gaps in terms of gender and in terms of age (3 groups: 15-30; 31-65; 65+); gender gap = mean of share of women in survey – share of female participating respondents (signing petitions / attending demonstrations) and share of men in survey – share of male participating respondents (signing petitions / attending demonstrations) (differences in absolute values); age gap = mean of share of respondents 18-30/31-65/65+ years old – respective share of 18-30/31-65/65+ year old participating respondents (signing petitions / attending demonstrations) (differences in absolute values). (2) Calculation of degree of unrepresentative turnout: sum of gender gap + age gap. (3) Overall mean of both indicators (signing petition / attending demonstrations) for unrepresentative participation. (4) The scale was reversed by multiplying its values by -1.


- Source(s): own calculation based on AfB, AsB, AsnB, CSES, ESS, LAPOP, LB, WVS, ISS, EES, EB.
EFFECTIVE PARTICIPATION [PAR_EFPA]

1. Rules facilitating participation [PAR_EFPA1]

Facilitat
- Definition: Facilitation of electoral participation.
- Categories: 0 = voters can vote at specific polling station only; 1 = voters can vote everywhere in the same district; 2 = voters can vote everywhere in the country; Additional point (+1) if absentee ballot is possible; Additional point (+1) if there are mobile polling stations; Additional point (+1) if there is a possibility to vote in advance.
- Measurement notes: (I) Since 2015 is the advanced voting data not available anymore. Therefore, the values are coded manually with the ACE database. (II) Missing values for Serbia 2006-2011.
- Source(s): ACE, IDEA-T, Blais et al. (2007), EV.

Registr
- Definition: Voter registration is not required, i.e. no action is needed by the voter to get a place on the voter register (1 = no action required, 0 = action required). 1 was coded in the following instances: (I) If vote rights are based on the population register (which implies automated registration); (II) If self-registration is required but mandatory (i.e., if there are fines for failing to register; (III) If registration is required but done by the state (e.g., the state dispatches teams to register voters). 0 was coded if self-registration is required to exercise the right to vote, but there is no automatic process and if the registration is voluntary (e.g., in the U.S.).
- Source(s): ACE, CON, Rosenberg/Chen (2009). OSCE, CCP.

2. Effective institutionalized participation [PAR_EFPA2]

Meanpart
- Definition: Participation rate in % of registered electorate in elections of respective or previous years (only first ballot considered if more were held): average of legislative elections (copied to years of following legislation), and presidential elections if they exist (copied to years of following legislation).
- Source(s): US Census Bureau AED, ANU, IDEA-T, IPU, UCI, USEP.

Eff_DD
- Definition: Effective use of direct democratic instruments. Sum of national non-mandatory referenda per year.
- Measurement notes: (I) The data is recoded by adding +1 to every observation. (II) The log of the number of non-mandatory referenda is taken to account for the fact that an additional referendum is less important in countries with many referenda than in countries with few referenda. (III) Missing value for Montenegro 2006. (IV) Czechoslovakia, FR Yugoslavia Taiwan are completely missing.
- Source(s): ACE, c2d

3. Effective non-institutionalized participation [PAR_EFPA3]

Petition
- Definition: Practice of non-institutionalized participation: share of survey respondents who indicate having signed petitions.

- Source(s): own calculation based on AFB, AsB, AsnB, CSES, ESS, LB, WVS, ISS, EES, EB.

**Demons**

- **Definition:** Practice of non-institutionalized participation: share of survey respondents who indicate having attended lawful demonstrations.


- Source(s): own calculation based on AFB, AsB, AsnB, CSES, ESS, LAPOP, LB, WVS, ISS, EES, EB.
REPRESENTATION [REPRES]

SUBSTANTIVE REPRESENTATION [REP_SR]

1. Structural possibilities for inclusion of preferences [REP_SR1]

Seatperin
- Definition: Number of statutory seats (lower house) per 100'000 inhabitants.
- Source(s): ACEA, Bormann/Golder (2013), DPI, IPU, UNSTATS, WB, additional individual internet research.

No_district
- Definition: Number of districts in lowest tier. The logarithm (log 10) of the number of districts is taken to account for the fact that more districts are less important in countries, which already have many districts (diminishing marginal returns of additional district).
- Source(s): IPU, Golder (2004), PDoA, Electoral statistics, additional individual internet research.

2. Constitutional provisions for direct democracy [REP_SR2]

Dirdem
- Definition: Constitutional provisions for direct democracy. Sum of four direct democratic institutions (1 point for each institution). 1) Mandatory referendum; 2) veto-player referendum: referendum is triggered and question is asked by an existing veto-player; 3) popular veto: non veto-player (part of parliament, citizens…) triggers referendum, but question is asked by an existing veto player; 4) popular initiative: non veto-player asks question and triggers referendum.
- Measurement notes: 1) only binding referenda are considered; 2) referenda are considered when they exclude certain issues (e.g. budgetary questions) but not if they only include specific questions (e.g. referendum only possible for EU-Accession); (III) Missing values for Montenegro 2006; Slovenia 1990. (IV) Czechoslovakia, FR Yugoslavia and Taiwan are completely missing. (V) 2014-2017: Values copied from 2013 unless a constitutional change took place or unless secondary sources indicated otherwise.
- Source(s): Hug/Tsebelis (2002); ACE, C2d; Cons; Electoral laws; Direct Democracy Navigator; Welp/Serdült (2009).

DD_Quora
- Definition: Constitutional provisions for approval or participation quorum in direct democratic votes.
- Measurement notes: (I) Approval quorum: 1-2*approval quorum; Participation quorum: 1-participation quorum. Reason: to reach an approval quorum of 25%, at least 50% of the population must participate. (II) Countries with no direct democracy receive the value of the country with the highest quorum (0). (III) Missing values for Albania 1990-1999; Lithuania 1991; Montenegro 2006; Slovenia 1990. (IV) Czechoslovakia, France, FR Yugoslavia and Taiwan are completely missing. (V) 2014-2017: Values copied from 2013 unless a constitutional change took place or unless secondary sources indicated otherwise.
- Source(s): Own calculations based on: Kaufmann et al. (2006), ACM, Venice Commission, C2D, Herrera/Mattozzi (2010), Auer/Bützer (2001), Rodrigo Salazar (2008), IDEA-T, ACE
3. No distortion [REP_SR3]

Gallagindex
- Definition: Index of disproportionality between vote and seat distributions according to the Gallagher “Least Squares Index” for all parties in general election (reversed). Where \( v_i \) is the percentage of votes obtained by ith party and \( s_i \) is the percentage of seats obtained by ith party.
  
  \[
  \mathbf{G} = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left[ v_i - s_i \right]^2
  \]

- Measurement notes: (I) The scale was reversed by multiplying values by -1. (II) The variable was weighted in the years in which general elections took place in order to take into account that elections divide the year into two periods with different values for the Gallagher Index. On the basis of the number of days between January 1 and December 31 two numeric values were calculated expressing every period’s share in days before and after the day of general elections. These expressions were used to calculate a weighted average of the Gallagher Index for the respective years. (III) All countries: The unweighted values were copied forward for years with no general elections. (IV) Missing values for Albania 1990; Estonia 1991; Latvia 1991-1992; Lithuania 1991; Moldova 1991-1993; Panama 1990-1993; Poland 1990; South Africa 1990-1993; Ukraine 1991-1993. (IV) Czechoslovakia, Kosovo and Taiwan are completely missing.

- Source(s): WZB.

Issuecongr
- Definition: Congruence between distribution of left/right positions among voters and distribution of left/right positions among members of parliament (measured by party positions). Calculated as follows: (1) Each party was assigned to one of three categories (left/middle/right), which were calculated on the basis of the mean and standard deviation of the distribution of left/right positions of all parties for a given election (e.g. left range: left of 1 standard deviation). The distribution of the three categories within parliaments was then calculated by taking into account the seat shares of the different parties. The value from the election year was used for all years up to the next election. (2) Voters, i.e. survey respondents, were assigned to one of three categories (left/middle/right) according to their self-placement on a left-right scale. The three categories were determined by subdividing the left-right scale (either ranging from 1-10 or 0-10) on the grounds of mean and standard deviation. The distribution of voters across the three categories was then calculated and the values averaged across 5 years (1990-1995; 1996-2000; 2001-2005 etc.) (3) For each of the categories, the differences between the seat shares in parliament and among voters were calculated. These issue differences for each category are then added and divided by 2. This gives a scale (theoretically) ranging from 0-100, where 0 = complete congruence and 100 = complete incongruence between voters and parliament. (4) The scale was reversed by subtracting values from 100.


DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION [REP_DR]

1. No legal constraints for inclusion of minorities [REP_DR1]

Constraints
- Definition: Measures the existence of constraints regarding passive suffrage and inverses the score: 8-\( \sum \) of 5 different indicators:
  - Age: Different constraints of age regarding passive suffrage in the national parliament (if bicameral parliament: lower chamber); Categories: 0 = to be entitled to passive suffrage at the age of 18 or before; 1 = to be entitled to passive suffrage at the age between 19 and 24; 2 = to be entitled to passive suffrage at the age of 25 or after.
  - Citizenship: measures if citizenship is a pre-condition for passive suffrage in the national parliament (if bicameral parliament: lower chamber); Categories: 0 = citizenship is no pre-condition for passive suffrage; 1 = citizenship is a pre-condition for passive suffrage.
  - Citizenship by birth: measures if citizenship BY BIRTH is a pre-condition for passive suffrage in the national parliament (if bicameral parliament: lower chamber); Categories: 0 = citizenship by birth is no pre-condition for passive suffrage; 1 = citizenship by birth is a pre-condition for passive suffrage.
  - Offices: measures the number of incompatible offices regarding passive suffrage by coding: 1) incompatibility with other elected posts; 2) exclusion of high civil servants; 3) exclusion of high military and/or police officers; 4) exclusion of all civil servants; 5) exclusion of all members of security or military forces; 5) existence of compulsory military service. Categories: 0 = incompatible with other elected political posts such as: presidency, government minister, Prime
Minister, member in other parliament (e.g. local or European parliament), high judges (e.g. federal judge or judge of supreme court); members of electoral commissions; 1 = exclusion of high members of civil service or security forces; 2 = exclusion of all civil servants or all members of the military forces (no compulsory service); 3 = exclusion of all members of the military forces and compulsory military service.

- Others: measures the existence of other constraints regarding passive suffrage (besides requirements necessary for the active suffrage); Categories: 0 = no, there are no other constraints; 1 = yes, there are other constraints (e.g. imprisonment; extended naturalization period; membership in certain organizations).


Source(s): IPU-Chronicles.

Partreg

- Definition: Ban of ethnic minority parties. Categories: 0 = there is a ban of ethnic minority parties; 1 = no parties are banned. If regional parties are banned the variable is coded as 0.

Measurement notes: -

Source(s): CON, Constitute, IAEP

2. Adequate representation of women [REP_DR2]

**Womrep**

- Definition: Proportion of female representatives in the lower house of parliament in % of all seats.


- Source(s): Armingeon et al. (2010), Vanhanen (2008), IPU, WB

**Womgov**

- Definition: Proportion of female representatives in the government (incl. ministerial positions)


- Source(s): HDR, IPU, UNECE, UN Women.

3. Effective access to power for minorities [REP_DR3]

**Minrep**

- Definition: Index of descriptive representation of autochthonous ethnic minority groups in the lower chamber of parliament. Ethnic minority groups are selected on the basis of politically relevant ethnic groups according to EPR-ETH (groups > 1%). Descriptive representation is defined as the representation of minority groups through members of their own ethnic groups. Proportionality of descriptive representation is measured as a reversed Gallagher index; where refers to a group’s share
in the population and to the share of descriptive representatives in parliament. The index is restricted at 1 in order not to correct for overrepresentation.

- Measurement notes: (I) Values between elections are copied from previous election. (II) Homogenous countries (Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden, and Taiwan) receive the highest value in the sample (1). (III) Missing values for indigenous groups in Latin America where replaced by 0 for the 1990s if the first available value was 0 (because it is highly unlikely that indigenous representation was higher in earlier time periods. (IV) Values for Bosnia-Herzegovina refer to party sizes. (IV) Values for the United Kingdom refer to MPs in the regions (Scots, Wales). (V) South Africa: Minority groups were recoded into “black” and “non-black”, or “white” and “non-white” for the Apartheid period, respectively. Afrikaans (“whites”) in South Africa are not coded as the minority group up to 1994 because they were the dominant group. (VI) All countries: values for 2015 and 2017 are missing. (VII) Austria, Croatia, Italy, Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia are completely missing for all years. (VIII) Additional missing values for Albania 1990; Croatia 1991-2006; Estonia 2012-2014; Latvia 2012-2014; Lithuania 1991, 2012-2014; Moldova 1991-1993; Romania 1990-1991; Turkey 1990-2012.
- Source(s): HRR, Hänni (2017), MAR.

Minpower

- Definition: Access to central power by ethnic minority groups (mean of all countries).
- Categories: 1 = discriminated; 2 = powerless; 3 = regional or separatist autonomy; 4 = junior partner; 5 = senior partner.
- Measurement notes: (I) majority groups were deleted from the dataset. (II) Indigenous population in Bolivia and Guatemala is coded as minority group even though they are in a numerical majority. (III) Afrikaans in South Africa are not coded as the minority group up to 1994 because they were the dominant group. (IV) Ashkenazim in Israel are not coded as a minority group. (V) Mainland Chinese in Taiwan are not coded as a minority group until 2000, as they dominate the political system up to this point. (VI) In Belgium, all ethnic groups were coded as minority groups due to their equal constitutional status. (VII) Homogenous countries receive the highest value in the sample (4.33). (VIII) Missing values for Croatia 1991; Slovenia 1990-1991.
- Source: Cederman et al. (2013)
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Banks Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive.
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http://www.elections.ca/res/rec/fra/Potential_Impacts_e.pdf

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BPHW Banks' Political Handbooks of the World.

BTI Bertelsmann Transformation Index https://www bli-project org/en/


CD Comtrade Database (UN). http://comtrade.un.org

CDA CentralAmericaData. http://www.centralamericad data.com/es/article/home/Costa_Rica_y_El_Salvador_si n_Ley_de_Acceso_a_Informacion

CIA CIA World Factbook.

CIRI The Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset.

CIRIGHTS https://www.binghamton.edu/institutes/hri/researcher-resources.html


CON Specific constitution of every country. http://confinder.richmond.edu

Constitute Constitute: The World's Constitutions to Read, Search, and Compare https://www.constituteproject.org/#/


CTOCIDTP Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-9&chapter=4&lang=en#7


DAP Democracy Assistance Project - Phase II. Steven E. Finkel, Anibal Perez-Liñan, Mitchell A. Seligson and C. Neal Tate
Dexia
Local Governments in the World. Basic Facts on 82 selected countries

DPI

EB
Eurobarometer Trend File
http://www.gesis.org/?id=798

ECPHRFF
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms

EES
European Election Survey
http://www.ees-homepage.net/

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ESS
European Social Survey.
http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org

EUROSTAT
http://epp-eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home

EV
Early Voting. United States.
http://www.earlyvoting.net/blog/2010/05/balloting-busy

FH
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=16

FI
Freedominfo.org The global network of freedom of information advocates
www.freedominfo.org

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GALLAGHER
Election indices

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GFS
Government Finance Statistics CD-ROM. International Monetary Fund.

GRECO
Group of Countries against Corruption. Evaluations.
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/index_en.asp


IAPPT Inter-American Convention To Prevent And Punish Torture. http://www.oas.org/juridico/English/Sigs/a-51.html

IAEP Institutions and Elections Project Dataset. https://havardhegre.net/iaep/


IDEA-F Political Finance Database. International IDEA. https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/political-finance-database

IDEA-T Voter turnout. International IDEA. http://www.idea.int/vt


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International Parliamentary Union. Parline database.
http://www.ipu.org/parline

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Latin American Public Opinion Project. Vanderbilt University.
http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop

LB
Latinobarometro.
http://www.latinobarometro.org

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MAR
Minorities at Risk Project.
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/data.asp

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MT
http://www.mondotimes.com

Nohlen (1995)

Nohlen (2004)

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Nohlen et al. (1999)


Partylaw Party Law in Modern Europe. http://www.partylaw.leidenuniv.nl/

PDoA Political Database of the Americas. Georgetown University. http://pdba.georgetown.edu


PTS Political Terror Scale. http://www.politicalterrorscale.org


RTI The Global Right to Information Rating by Center of Law and Democracy https://www.rt-rating.org/country-data/


SGI Bertelsmann Sustainable Governance Indicators https://www.sgi-network.org/


TI Transparency International http://www.transparency.org/


UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime http://www.unodc.org/


References
Appendix 1: Overview

The following pages give a short overview of the functions (concept tree, indicators). Additionally, tables with first results were presented.

The colors in the conceptual trees have the following meanings:
dark blue: Overall quality of democracy score (QOD)
mint: principles
light blue: functions
yellow: components
orange: subcomponents measuring effective impact (rules in use)
pink: subcomponents measuring constitutional settings (rules in law)
green: indicators
1 OVERALL QUALITY OF DEMOCRACY, PRINCIPLES, FUNCTIONS - CONCEPT TREE
2 INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES

2.1 Concept Tree

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**Individual Liberties (INDLIB)**

- **Right to physical integrity (IL_PHIN)**
  - Constitutional provisions guaranteeing physical integrity [IL_PHIN1]
    - Consttort
    - Convterr

- **Right to free conduct of life (IL_SELFU)**
  - Constitutional provisions guaranteeing freedom of conduct of life [IL_SELFU1]
    - Constrel
    - Constfreemov

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**Right to physical integrity (IL_PHIN)**

- No transgressions by the state [IL_PHIN2]
- Mutual acceptance of right to physical integrity by citizens [IL_PHIN3]
  - Homicide
  - Riot

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**Right to free conduct of life (IL_SELFU)**

- Freedom of conduct of life [IL_SELFU2]
- Effective property rights [IL_SELFU3]
  - Freerelig
  - Freemove
  - Secprop
3 RULE OF LAW
3.1 Concept Tree

Rule of Law [RULEOFLAW]

Equality before the law [RL_EQL]
- Constitutional provisions for impartial courts [RL_EQL1]
  - Constfair
  - Pubtrial

- Effective independence of the judiciary [RL_EQL2]
  - Judindepcom

- Effective impartiality of the legal system [RL_EQL3]
  - Impcourts

Quality of the legal system [RL_QUAL]
- Constitutional provisions for judicial professionalism [RL_QUAL1]
  - Profjudge
  - Proftenure

- Confidence in the justice system [RL_QUAL2]
  - Confjust
  - Fairjust

- Confidence in the police [RL_QUAL3]
  - Confpolice
  - Fairpolice
4 PUBLIC SPHERE

4.1 Concept Tree

Public Sphere [PUBLIC]

- Freedom to associate [PS_FRAS]
  - Constitutional provisions guaranteeing freedom to associate [PS_FRAS1]
    - Constfras
    - Constass
  - Degree of association (economic interests) [PS_FRAS2]
    - Union
    - Memproorg
  - Degree of association (public interest) [PS_FRAS3]
    - Memhuman
    - Memenviron

- Freedom of opinion [PS_FROP]
  - Constitutional provisions guaranteeing freedom of speech [PS_FROP1]
    - Constspeech
    - Constpress
  - Media offer [PS_FROP2]
    - Newsimp
    - Newspaper
  - Political neutrality of the press system [PS_FROP3]
    - Medinteg
    - Freeinternet
5 Competition

5.1 Concept Tree

- Competition
  - Vulnerability (Competitiveness of elections) [CO_COMP]
    - Formal rules for competitiveness [CO_COMP1]
      - Meandistrict
      - Geryman
    - Closeness of electoral outcomes [CO_COMP2]
      - Largepavo
      - Votediff
    - Low concentration of seats [CO_COMP3]
      - Herfindex
      - Seatdiff
  - Contestability (Openness of elections) [CO_OPEN]
    - Low legal hurdles for entry [CO_OPEN1]
      - Adminhurd
      - Leg_thresh
    - Effective contestation [CO_OPEN2]
      - Smallpavo
      - Enep
    - Effective access to resources [CO_OPEN3]
      - Ceilings
      - Funding
6 Mutual Constraints

6.1 Concept Tree

- Mutual constraints of constitutional powers [MUTUCONS]
  - Checks between three powers [MC_CHECKS]
    - Balance of checks between executive and legislative powers [MC_CHECKS1]
      - Balexleg
    - Balance between executive and legislative powers [MC_CHECKS2]
      - Balpowexle
    - Judicial review [MC_CHECKS3]
      - Powjudi
  - Vertical checks of power [MC_VERT]
    - Degree of Federalism [MC_VERT1]
      - Federalism
    - Subnational fiscal autonomy [MC_VERT2]
      - Subexp
      - Bicameralism
      - Subrev
7 Governmental Capability
7.1 Concept Tree
8 Transparency
8.1 Concept Tree

Transparency [TRANSPAR]

No secrecy [TR_NOSEC]
- Disclosure of party financing [TR_NOSEC1]
  - Discinco
  - Discexp
- Absence of corruption [TR_NOSEC2]
  - Corrup
- Freedom of information [TR_PTPP1]
  - LegFOI
- Provisions for transparent political process [TR_PTPP]
  - Transp
  - Willingness for transparent communication [TR_PTPP3]
9 Participation

9.1 Concept Tree

Participation [Particip]

Equality of participation [PAR_EQPA]
  Suffrage [PAR_EQPA1]
    Suffrage
    Regprovap
  Non-selectivity of electoral participation [PAR_EQPA2]
    Repturnined
    Repturngeag
  Non-selectivity of alternative participation [PAR_EQPA3]
    Repaltined
    Repaltgeag
  Rules facilitating participation [PAR_EFPA1]
    Facilitat
    Registr
  Effective institutionalized participation [PAR_EFPA2]
    Meanpart
    Eff_DD
  Effective non-institutionalized participation [PAR_EFPA3]
    Petitions
    Demons
10 Representation

10.1 Concept Tree

- Representation [REPRES]
  - Substantive representation [REP_SR]
    - Structural possibilities for inclusion of preferences [REP_SR1]
      - Seatperin
      - No district
    - Constitutionall provisions for direct democracy [REP_SR2]
      - Dirdem
      - DD_Quora
    - No distortion [REP_SR3]
      - Gallangindex
      - Issuecongr
  - Descriptive representation [REP_DR]
    - No legal constraints for inclusion of minorities [REP_DR1]
      - Constraints
      - Partreg
      - Womrep
      - Womgov
    - Adequate representation of women [REP_DR2]
    - Effective access to power for minorities [REP_DR3]
      - Minrep
      - Minpower